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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LYtlN A. JENKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v-

)

MORONI L. JENSEN, STATE OF
UTAH, ROBERT B. HANSEN,
Attorney General of the State
of Utah, DAVID S. MONSON,
Secretary of State/Lt.
Governor of Utah,

)

CASE NO. 17240

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MORONI L. JENSEN

NATURE OF CASE
The plaintiff, Lynn A. Jenkins, brought this
declaratory judgment action seeking to remove the name of
defendant Moroni L. Jensen from the 1980 primary election
ballot.

In this election, Mr. Jensen seeks the Democratic

nomination for the office of Lieutenant Governor/Secretary
of State.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third District Court for Salt Lake County in an
order dated July 30, 1980, dismissed the plaintiff's complaint
with prejudice.

Plaintiff's subsequent motion to reconsider

was denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent Moroni L. Jensen seeks an affirrnance of the district court's order which dismissed plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although the Statement of Facts in Appellant's Brief
is generally accurate, it gives an incomplete picture of the
facts upon which the district court's decision was based.
Accordingly, defendant Jensen will restate the facts in their
entirety.
Plaintiff, Lynn A. Jenkins, is a Republican Candidate
for the Utah State Senate from Senate District Eight (R.
Like many other candidates for public office in Utah this
election year, Mr. Jenkins faces a primary run-off on
September 9, 1980.
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'I

Defendant Moroni L. Jensen, a Democrat, has been a
member of the Utah State Senate.

His term of office commenced

January 1, 1977 and ends December 31, 1980 (R.

).

In April

1980, Mr. Jensen annotmced his intention to run for the position
of Secretary of State (R.

).

He duly filed for the position,

and ca8e out of the Democratic Party Convention facing a primary
election in September (R.

).

On February 2, 1980, the 43rd Legislature enacted House
Bill 60 which raised the salaries of State officers effective
January 1, 1981, as follows:
From

To

$40,000

$48,000

Attorney General

30,000

36,500

Secretary of State

26,500

33,500

State Auditor

26,500

33,500

State Treasurer

26,500

33,500

Governor

The increase for the Secretary of State, the State Auditor,
~nd the State Treasurer of $7,000 per year is equivalent to

26.4 percent.

The Attorney General and the Governor received

a slightly smaller percentage increase amounting to more than
20 percent.

Each of these offices had also received a salary

increase effective in 1978.

With respect to the Secretary of

State this prior salary increase amounted to $4,500, from
$22,000 to $26,500.

-3-
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The 1979 Utah Legislature also passed a joint resolution
(Senate Joint Resolution No. 7) which places before Utah
voters in November 1980 several revisions of the Executive
Article of the Utah Constitution.

Among these revisions,

the Resolution proposes that the name of the office of
Secretary of State be changed to Lieutenant Governor and
that the method of election to this position be changed so
that the candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of
each party shall appear together on the ballot and a vote
for the Governor of one party shall be deemed a vote for
that party's Lieutenant Governor.

The Resolution, of course,

provides that this method of voting for Governor and Lieutenant Governor shall not take effect until the election in
1984, since there can be no election under the new constitutiona;
Should the constitutiona: ·
I
I
revisions be approved by the voters this coming November, the

provision for either office until then.

name of the office shall be changed to Lieutenant Governor
effective January 1, 1981.

Other than this change of name,

the proposed constitutional revisions placed before the
electorate by S.J.R. No. 7 will have no significant effect
on the office of Secretary of State until the election of

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1984.

As of now, the changes in the Executive Article are

a mere proposal, subject to the voter's approval in November.
Plaintiff Jenkins contends that both the salary
increase and the modifications in the office of the
Secretary of State proposed in S. J. R. No. 7 are prohibited
by Article VI Section 7 of the Utah Constitution:

No member of the Legistlature, during the
term for which he was elected, shall be appointed
or elected to any civil office or profit under
this State, which shall have been created, or
the emoluments of which shall have been increased,
during the term for which he was elected.
In the proceedings below, Plaintiff contended that he
had standing to challenge Mr. Jensen's place on the nemocratic
primary ballot since he is a Republican candidate for the
State Senate and certain voters who might otherwise vote in
the Republican primary, and vote for him, would vote in the
Democratic primary because Mr. Jensen was on that ballot.
As a remedy, Plaintiff asked that the district court
issue an order restraining the incumbent Secretary of State,
Davici S. }~on son, from issuing a certificate for primary
election in the name of defendant Jensen.
The district court rejected defendant Jensen's contention that the Plaintiff had not standing to bring this action
and that his filing of this suit was untimely in view of ?'r.
Jensen's long-announced intentions to run for the office of
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Secretary of State.

However, the trial court granted Defen-

dant's motion to dismiss because Plaintiff's claims are
clearly governed by the case of Shields v. Toronto 16 Utah
2d 61, 365 P.2d 829 (1964).

The uncontradicted affidavits

from economic experts and judicial notice of generally known
economic facts established that the salary increases given
State executive officers during Mr. Jensen's term as a
State Senator appeared to be an attempt to maintain their
salary at a level consistent with current rates of inflation.

The district judge also concluded that to deny

defendant Jensen a position on the September primary ballot would be an interference with the democratic election
of state officials.
S. J. R. No.

Finally, the court concluded that

7 does not "create a new off"ice within the

meaning of Article VI Section 7 of the Utah Constitution".
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT CONFORMED WITH

THIS COURT'S RULING IN SHIELDS v. TORONTO.
In 1964 this Court held that three candidates for exect~~

I

office were not disqualfied from appearing on primary ballots
even though they had been members of the 1963 Legislature
which had enacted a general salary increase raising the
emoluments of the offices they sought.

The Court specifically

held that their candidacy did not violate the provisions of
Article VI Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

Shields v.
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16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P,2d 829 (1964).
Justice Crockett's comprehensive opinion considers the
purpose and rationale of Article VI.

The opinion states that

the Article was not designed to prohibit legislators from running
for office simply because they are members of a body which had
voted a pay increase for that office.

Rather, the purpose of

the provision is to prevent connivance and manipulation among
legislators to benefit themselves by creating offices or by
voting themselves pay increases with the clear purpose of improperly enriching themselves.
When, however, the increases do not enrich the office
holder, but merely keeps him approximately even with inflation,
the mischief the provision is meant to prevent would not occur.
As the opinion states:
"The important fact here is that the salary
increases involved could not by any stretch
of the imagination be regarded as partaking of
the impropriety just referred to . . . (T]hese
relatively small increases . . . should properly
be regarded as just what they were, a moderate cost
of living adjustment on an acro~s th7 ~oard
basis in keeping with the steadily rising cost of
living. Accordingly, it can be said with assurance
that this is not a situation which would lend
itself to any ulterior scheme by a legislator
to set up a high payine sinecure to take.advantage
of which Section 7 of Article VI was designed
to prevent." 395 P. 2d at 831.
The pay increases at issue in this appeal are precisely
of the kind approved in Toronto.
First, there is no suggestion, either in plaintiff's

-7-
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pleadings or in the record before the District Court, that
there was any improper motivation, manipulation, or attempt to
benefit Mr. Jensen or any member of the legislature.
Second, the pay increases were enacted as part of
legislative bills granting pay increases to other constitutional
officers of the State.

The Governor, the Attorney General, the

State Auditor and the State Treasurer, all received similar,
though not exactly equal, percentage increases (all in the 20
to 30 percent range).
Third, and most significantly, the record before the
District Court was abundantly clear that the increases in
question reflected a legislative attempt to maintain the salary
level of the Secretary of State during a time of accelerating
and severe inflation.

Indeed, the record demonstrates that the

real salary of the Secretary of State has been increased by only
a fraction of a percent during the last ten years.
In support of his motion to dismiss, respondent submitted
an affidavit (R.

) prepared by Mr. Frank K. Stuart, an economic

analyst and consultant.

Attached to Mr. Stuart's affidavit, as

Exhibit 1, was a table showing the effect of inflation on all pay
increases granted to the Secretary of State since May of 1963
(R.

).

Mr. Stuart's analysis is most revealing.

During

Mr. Jensen's last term in the legislature, the dollar increase

-8-
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at the Secretary of State's salary was from $22,000 to $33,500.
During the same period, the adJ·usted real 1·ncome increased
·
only
from $17,178 to $17,761 for a total of $583.00. 1
Mr. Stuart determined that since 1973, the Secretary of
State has, in real dollar terms, had a decrease in his salary.
In January of 1972, the salary had a real dollar value of $19,239;
as of January of 1981, the value will be $17, 761.
Mr. Stuart's analysis also somewhat understates the
actual amount of this salary decrease.

The Secretary of State

has no assurance as to when, if ever, his salary will again be
increased.

Thus, in a time of persistent inflation, his fixed

salary will decrease in real dollar value.
Mr. Stuart also made a long term analysis of the effect
of inflation on the Secretary of State's salary.
covered was May, 1963 through January, 1981.

The period

This analysis

showed that between 1963 and 1969, there was an increase in the
salary's real dollar value.
1
The analysis was made by using statistical indicators developed
by the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis.
These indicators are published in the Department's Survey of
Current Business. The effect of inflation is determined by
using what is termed an "implicit price deflator index." 1972
dollars are shown by the index as having a value of 100. For
years prior to 1972, when the value of the dollar was greate:,
the index is less than 100. For succeeding years the value is
more than 100. Thus, in 1975, the deflator index was 12~.07.
The estimate for the deflator index for January of 1981 is
188.62. The difference in deflator index values will, of course,
determine the actual percentage decrease in the value of the
salary.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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With the sharply rising inflation of the late 1960's, the
real value of the Secretary of State's salary began to erode.
Since that time, the overall trend has shown a decrease in salan
value.

For the entire eighteen year period between 1963 and

1981, the salary has shown a slight rate of real dollar increase.
The Secretary of State experienced an actual dollar increase
salary from $11,000 to $33,500.

~

This amounted to 204.51'. increase

which computes to an annual rate of 6. 3%.

Over the same eighteer

year period the real dollar salary increased from $15,413 to
$17,761, or a percentage increase of 15.2%.

The average annual

increase was only .8%.
At the hearing on the motion to reconsider, respondent sul·
mitted an affidavit of Steven J. Nicolatus.

Mr. Nicolatus is

a consulting economist employed by Mr. Stuart.

Mr. Nicolatus

compared the Secretary of State's salary increases with those
given to professional level State employees.

His analysis showec

that the Secretary of State, between 1970 and 1981, enjoyed an
annual growth rate in compensation of 6.1/',.

A professional em·

ployee at entry salary level had for the same period a 6. 9% salac
growth rate.

Mr. Nicolatus also considered merit pay increases

to which professional level employees would be entitled.

When thi

increases are included, the typical professional level employee
experienced an annual increase of 9%, or some fifty percent more
than the rate of increase for the Secretary of State.
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Mr. Nicolatus also analyzed the increase of the total
compensation package paid to the Secretary of State.

Included

among these benefit items are F.I.C.A., federal withholding tax,
insurance and the state retirement plan.

Between 1977 and 1981,

this total benefit package increased from $29,558 to $41,333,
for a percentage increase of 39.8%.

In real dollar terms, however,

the entire benefit package increased from only $20,860 to
$21,913.

This is a percentage increase of only 5%, which yields

an average annual growth rate of 1.2%.
The interesting point about this analysis is that these
benefit items were not the result of specific legislative enactment.

Federal withholding tax, F.I.C.A., insurance, and the

state retirement plan were granted by either federal law or
general legislative enactment.

Nonetheless, the average rate

of increase in real dollars during the period was very small indeed.
This economic data demonstrated that the pay increases in
issue in this litigation in an amount and for a purpose consistent
with the rule and rationale of Shields v. Toronto.

Supra.

Enacted

in a time of persistent and often accelerating inflation, these
increases reflect a legislative attempt to maintain the purchasing power of the Secretary of State's salary.

Indeed, one

could make a very strong case from the data presented to the District Court that the actual value of the salary has decreased
during the period of Mr. Jensen's legislative term.
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II.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 7 DID NOT "CREATE"

A CIVIL OFFICE
In point 5 of his otherwise generally coIIllllendable
brief, plaintiff argues that Senate Joint Resolution No. 7
"is a creation of a new constitutional office."

In fact,

the 1979 legislature did nothing but place before the voters
of Utah a proposal to modify certain aspects of the Executive
Article of the Utah Constitution.

As mentioned above, one of

these modifications would change the name of the office of
Secretary of State, wherever it appears in the Constitution,
to "Lieutenant Governor" and would change the method of voting
for this office.

These modifications, even if they do amount t

a "creation of office," are not the creation of the legislatur1
If they ever become effective, they will be the creation of th1
electorate of the State of Utah.
anything yet.

Of course, no one has "creat1

No one will know whether the so-called "created

office" will come into existence at all until November, 1980.
A legislative act placing before the voters the decisic'
of whether a new administrative or executive office will be
formed does not constitute "creation" of office as contemplatei
by Article VI Section 7.

State v. Gooding, 22 Idaho 128, 124

P. 791 (1912), is almost directly on point.

There an appoint·

ment to the office of Commissioner of Highways was challenged
because the appointee was a member of the legislature that
authorized the voters and landowners of Idaho to organize a
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highway district upon certain terms and conditions.

The Idaho

Supreme Court held that this was not the creation of an office.
The Idaho Supreme Court said:
"The word 'create' means to cause to exist or
to bring into existence something which did
not exist. Said highway district law does not
create or purport to create any highway district,
but leaves the creation of such districts with the
people. Then the question is directly presented:
Did the Legislature create the office of highway
commissioner of Shoshone highway district No. 2?
"At the time the Legislature which enacted
said highway district law adjourned, there was
no office of highway commissioner of Shoshone
highway district No. 2, nor was there such an
office in the state of Idaho. Said act authorized the electors and landowners in the state to
organize a highway district upon certain terms
and conditions, if they concluded best to do so.
r1

hi
ti'

ei

"Had the act in question organized certain
highway districts and provided that such
district should have certain officers, then
the Legislature would have created the office.
But the Legislature by said act did not
attempt to create any districts whatever.
They left the creation of the district with the
people. . . " 124 P. 792-93.
The Gooding opinion is almost exactly analogous
with the Utah Legislature's actions in S.J.R. No. 7.

The

Legislature has done no more than propose to the people of
Utah that certain items of the Executive Article of the Utah
Constitution be revised.

These revisions will not take effect

until the general election of November, 1980.

If any office

has been created, it will not have been created until then
and it will not have been created by the Legislature, but by
the vote of the people.
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I

In fact, S. J. R. No. 7 does not create a

~

office at

It merely changes the name of an old office and modifies the
method by which votes are cast for that office.

In Westernpor

v. Green, 144 Md. 85, 124 A. 403 (1923), the Maryland General
Assembly enacted a statute which, in effect, changed the metho:
of electing a town clerk and made the clerk responsible for
collecting municipal taxes (a duty that had previously been
performed by a bailiff).

The Maryland court held that in chani

ing the duties of the clerk and in changing the method by whic:
he was elected, the Maryland Legislature had not created a
new office but merely modified the form and duties of an old
one.
Nothing has been changed in the office of Secretary
of State except its name and the method by which votes are
cast for the office.
III.

No new office has been created.

THE RESULT URGED HERE IS CONSISTENT WITH JUDICIAl

AUTHORITY FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS.
Courts of other jurisdictions have construed constitutional provisions similar to Article VI Section 7, to permit
the candidacy for public office of otherwise qualified candid·
ates.

Though challenges to candidacy have arisen in a

variety of factual settings and under differing constitutional
provisions, the courts repeatedly have found in the spirit and
purpose of such provisions strong reasons for permitting candid·
ates to be either approved or rejected by the electoral process.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Prominent among these decisions is the Florida case
of State ex rel. West v. Gray, 74 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1954), where
a special election was necessary because of the death of the
governor during his term of office.

A member of the state

legislature who had voted to increase the governor's salary
declared his candidacy for the office.

In construing the Florida

constitutional provision in issue, the Court reviewed the history
and purpose of that provision.
The Court first noted that:
The Constitution is concerned with substance
and not with form and its framers did not intend to forbid a common sense of application
of its provisions.
Gray, supra, 7450 2d at 118.

It also explained that:

All of the authorities are in agreement
that such a provision as is involved in
this proceeding is inserted in a constitution for the purpose of taking from a
senator or representative "any personal
motive which might operate upon him to
create a new office or increase the
emoluments of any office, new or old."
Tucker on the Constitution, Vol. 1, p.
442. As the matter is stated by Mr.
Justice Story, "The reasons for excluding persons from offices who have been
concerned in creating them, or increasing their emoluments, ar7 to take ~way!
as far as possible, any improper bias in
the vote of the representative, and to secure
to the constituents some soleIIm pledge
of his disinterestedness." Story on the
Constitution, 5th Ed., Vol. I, section 867,
p. 633.
(Emphasis in original).
The Court then considered changes in "public conditions"
since the enactment of the constitutional provision in question.
-15-
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Public conditions are vastly different
today. Many of the offices which were
appointive under the original Constitution
of 1885 have now, by amendment thereto,
been made elective. With the free dissemination of news and the close coverage
given the legislative deliberations by
press and radio, the people are much
better informed concerning the actions of
their legislators than they were in 1885,
and they can express their approval or
disapproval of such actions at the polls.
We have no doubt that, as to elective
offices, Section 5 of Article III was
calculated to, and did, serve a useful
purpose in the early days of this state's
history; indeed, it still does, within
the reasonable limits and for the plain
purposes for which it was enacted.
But
what was then thought to be a shield can,
if so strictly interpreted as to enlarge it
beyond its purpose, become a sword -- a
weapon which might easily eliminate capable
men from offering for public office . . .
Gray, supra, 7450 2d at 117.
Since the pay increase for which the prospective
candidate had voted as a legislator applied only to the term
of the governor then in office, and since the governor's
untimely death could not have been anticipated, the
Court reasoned that there was no real possibility that the
candidate had been influenced by improper motives when he
voted on the matter as a legislator.

Since the evil which

the provision was designed to prevent did not occur, the provision did not prohibit the legislator's candidacy.
The Court also emphasized that the legislator would
be required to run against formidable opponents in both the
primary and general elections when his candidacy would be
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submitted to the electorate.

For those reasons, the Florida

Court concluded that the emoluments of the office of governor
were not increased by the legislature so as to render a
legislator inelligible for the office.
In State v. Dubuque, 413 P.2d 972 (Wash 1966), the
Supreme Court of Washington resolved a challenge to the eligibility of members of the state legislature to run for reelection after their membershad voted to increase their own
salaries.

Washington's constitutional provision is virtually

identical to that which is in issue here, and it was contended
that since members of the legislature had voted to increase
the emoluments of the office of legislator, they could not,
during their term of office, run for re-election to that
office.
In construing the section, the court noted that:
strong public policy exists in favor
of eligibility for public office, and
the constitution, where the language
and context allows, should be construed
so as to preserve this eligibility.

A

Dubuque, supra, 413 P.2d at 981.

The court proceeded to explain

that the constitutional provision was designed, in part, to:
. . prevent a member of the legisl~ture
from increasing the salaries of public
officials and then, during the term for .
which he was elected legislator, maneuvering
to obtain the increased salary without an
intervening election.
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The court observed that one of the purposes of the constitutional provision will be satisfied if the voters have an
opportunity to pass on the leeislator's actions in increasing
public salaries.

The court held therefore that:

. . . where the salary increase does not
take effect during the term for which
the legislator was elected to the
legislature, he is not ineligible to
stand for election to and serve in an
office at a higher salary conunencing
with the expiration of his elected term
as legislator, because no part of the
increase will be earned during the
legislator's incumbent term of office.
Dubuaue, supra,
Explaining the basis of its holding the court
concluded:
We favor an interpretation tending to
unfetter the process of election as
more in keeping with democratic ideals
than a construction which inclines to
curtain the freedom to stand for office.
Despite the criticism and complaints
frequently directed by the people toward
their legislature, that body remains the
single most democratic organ of constitutional government yet devised, reflecting
with greater clarity and frequency probably
than any of our institutions--save possibly
the public schools--the will and aspirations
of a free people.
From this academy of
free representative government have come
some of our greatest presidents, ablest
jurists, most capable members of the
congress, and outstanding statesmen.
Perhaps no greater school exists for the
training of men to leadership in a
democracy than service in a state legislature.
The constitution ought, therefore,
where its language is susceptible of many
meanings, be construed to augment and
foster rather than curb and curtail the
elective process.
Eligibility should be
presumed rather than be denied.
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The foregoing review of decisions from other jurisdictions reveals that the analysis and application of our
constitution by this Court in Shields v. Toronto, supra, is
in harmony with the decisions and rulings of other courts and,
on the strength of the construction given the provisions in
issue by other courts, as well as this Court, the trial
court's ruling should be affirmed.
IV.

PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING TO BRING THE PRESENT

ACTION.
In addition to the other grounds stated in this
brief, respondent submits that dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint is proper because plaintiff did not demonstrate
a sufficient interest in the outcome of this litigation to
claim standing as a proper party plaintiff.
The District Court ruled on the following theory
that plaintiff does in fact have standing:

Plaintiff is

a candidate for the Republican nomination for Utah State
Senate from Senate District No. 8 and his name will appear
on the September 9 primary ballot.

Because it is possible

that some voters, who might otherwise vote for him in the
Republican primary, may choose to vote in the Democratic
primary because they wish to cast ballots for Moroni L. Jensen,
plaintiff's own candidacy may be damaged.
Plaintiff offered no evidence in support of his
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